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Pre-trialin the Courts: An Opinion
by Aaron Jacobson*

W

have been the
subject of much discussion and considerable writing in recent years-with this procedure enjoying the unique distinction
in law of an early and almost universal acceptance-little if anything has been said of it critically. This is so perhaps because of
the thirst among the legal confraternity for a means of modernizing its litigant-court relationships and in a manner acceptable to
all. Nor does the writer mean to telegraph a negative sentiment.
Coming out against pre-trial in these days of impatience overand a growing intolerance of-heavy docket backlogs and calendar congestion is tantamount to judicial heresy. It should not be
surprising, therefore, to find this surge of enthusiasm for what
has been hailed as the dietary answer to the over-weighted form
of justice, cloaked as it is in the handsome robes of ritual and
decor.
No claim is made, it is true, that pre-trial is the panacea for
what ail the courts. But in adopting it, there seems to have been
a haste which has bypassed the usual introspective examination
characteristic of our judiciary.
A critical examination, as seen by this writer, would take
the form of two broad questions:
One-Is pre-trial, viewed in the overall perspective of the
administration of justice, a healthy additive to the courts?
Two-If so, is it an end in itself, or is it simply one of a
number of modernizing influences, without all of which it remains ineffectual?
It will be seen, in the attempt to answer these questions,
that haste may have veiled many objectionable aspects of the
pre-trial conference.
HILE THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN PRE-TRIAL

A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
The Hon. Clarence L. Kincaid in his widely-distributed "A
Judge's Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure," comments that the
"increased use of arbitration within industry is chargeable directly to the dissatisfaction of businessmen with the cost and lack
* The author, a first-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, is a
member of the editorial department of The Cleveland News and has covered
courts for several years. He is a graduate of Ohio State University.
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of early finality experienced in submitting their controversies to
the court." 1 Similarly, Harry D. Nims, writing in his exhaustive
treatment of the subject, mentions that "in recent years, largely
because of procedural defects in our courts, the public have
sought, and in many instances found, methods of disposing of
their civil controversies outside the courts." 2 Hence, the monetary threat which, among others, appears to have triggered the
onset and early adoption of pre-trial.
By way of definition, the Hon. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, finds pre-trial to be
"a device for the improving of trials in the interest of justice, for
shortening them and incidentally for promoting settlements as
each side learns for the first time of the strength of his adversary's
case and the weakness of his own." 3
Mr. Nims breaks down his conception of it into two types
of conferences: "(a) The conference to simplify the issues, obtain consents to the admissibility of evidence and exhibits, limit
the number of expert witnesses, arrange a date for trial, and, in
general, to expedite disposition of the case; and (b) The discussion of routine pending cases by the court and counsel to consider, not methods of simplifying the trial, but to use the good
offices of a judge of the court as a friendly, official, impartial intermediary in an attempt to reach some disposition of the case
without trial . . ." 4 (emphasis added).
In its most orthodox form, pre-trial is conceived as operating,
first, by a rule of court that requires the pre-trying of all civil
cases before trial; second, by cases being calendarized for pretrial conferences, just as cases are docketed for trial in a given
order; third, by the mandatory appearance at the court-specified
time of opposing counsel and their parties of interest; fourth, by
a sitting down in either the open court or in chambers for an informal discussion which is given, however, a pattern of procedure;
fifth, by an attempt to stipulate facts and issues about which
there are no disputes; sixth, by an attempt to settle the case, if
settlement is possible, and if it is not, by an entering into the proceedings of a record of the pre-trial, showing the stipulations
agreed upon.
1 17 F. R. D. 439.
2 Pre-Trial, by Harry D. Nims, p. iv.
3 The Challenge of Law Reform, p. 63.
4 op cit, p. 12.
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THE INCONSISTENCIES OF PRE-TRIAL

In actual practice, there are as many varieties of pre-trial
as there are temperaments of pre-trying judges, and, as Mr. Nims
points out, "No orthodox way of conducting pre-trial has been
developed." 5
Another writer goes further with the observation that "one
judge will exert great pressure to induce parties to settle; another
will be interested principally in persuading parties to drop their
demands for jury trials; a third will feel that he should not induce the parties to do anything beyond what they had agreed to
prior to the conference; a fourth will thoroughly analyze the
case and do what he can to reduce the problems of proof and the
length of the trial." r The writer made this additional comment:
"Judges are only human, and each approaches his judicial function differently. Knowing the characteristics of the particular
judge before whom your pre-trial conference is to be held is
second in importance only to knowing all you can about the
judge in a non-jury trial." 7
It becomes the simplest of inferences, then, to conclude that
a given pre-trial will obtain only that measure of success as is
permitted by the probity of the pre-trying judge. It must further
follow that pre-trial is not a successful procedure per se. "Pretrial is not self-executing. It requires a sympathetic, co-operative
and industrious attitude on the part of both judge and attorney." 8
This is not true of general trial procedure. There, the judge
is contained within a strict framework of rules and laws that
dictate his conduct, and the checks and balances of our system
of jurisprudence ensure to a proven degree a uniformity of conduct. This cannot be said of pre-trial, where informality and a
relaxation of rules in effect remove that uniformity which systems of justice have striven so long to reach. For what is pretrial, in actuality, but a miniature trial. The judge is in his court.
So are opposing counsel and their clients. The case in question is
discussed, argued, limited by stipulation and very often settled
and dismissed.
5 op cit, p. 13.
6 Practicing Law Institute: "Federal Pre-Trial and Jury Trial Procedure,"
by Milton R. Wessel, p. 57.
7 ibid.
8 17 F. R. D. 445.
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THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC

The role of the judge in these quasi-judicial proceedings
needs further inquiry. He is in his court by virtue of a public
mandate or an appointive one. To it come parties of interest who
cannot resolve their problems privately. Once that recourse is
decided upon, the public at large has an interest. The pleadings
are public, as are the courts in which they are lodged. Does the
judge have the right to permit his office and himself to undergo
a sudden metamorphosis, whereby he becomes, instead, a referee
and his court a private bargaining table, all based on the proposition that this method is faster, or more efficient?
One of the least publicized but more important objectives of
pre-trials, particularly in personal injury litigation where settlements occur in three out of four cases,9 is secrecy. Defense lawyers representing insurance companies enjoy a double advantage:
the saving of time and expense in settling cases through the office
of the juridical intermediary without trial, and the exacting of a
promise from the pre-trying judge of silence regarding the
amount of the settlement. Any discussion of this hard fact is
conspicuously absent in the literature on pre-trial. Many attorneys will not enter into settlement discussions unless and until the participating judge agrees on secrecy. (The reason for
attempting secrecy appears to originate in a belief among insurors that public knowledge of tort judgments spoils juries,
lends a predisposition among the public to more lawsuits, and
creates difficulty in settlement because of widespread feeling in
plaintiffs that their case deserves a larger consideration.)
Yet take a pre-trial group, where settlement fails, and place
them in the open courtroom for trial and all the world may know
of their business. Thus does the strange duality in the courts
arise: a court conducting secret pre-trials (and reaching secret
settlements) on the one hand, and open trials on the other. To
argue, as defense lawyers often do, that the civil business among
litigants in a court is no business of the public is a contradiction
in terms. By extension, at what point would the public interest,
or claim of interest, arise? By the arbitrary designation of a bar
or a bench? They do not have such powers, impliedly or in fact.
The point is, of course, that the public's interest arises a priori,
and that such interest is necessary to the very existence of the
court. It cannot cease at any point in the administration of jus9 ibid, p. 450.
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tice. Indeed, where in all of this is the traditional court of law,
which by constitutional exhortation, shall be open?
This is not meant to say that opposing counsel may not settle
their differences privately at any point along the line of litigation.
The secrecy-aspect is stressed only in reference to a court's participation in a pre-trial and where the court becomes the instrumentality of settlement. Viewed in its most generous light, the
practice of judges in suppressing results of pre-trials gives rise
to a serious question of the legality of such acts, the rationale
for which is expeditious justice. The public, it can be argued,
may wonder where secrecy, once begun in the courts, may lead,
and where it may end.
THE COURT AND THE LITIGANT

The extent to which judges go in effecting dispositions of
cases in pre-trial is reflected in Mr. Wessel's paper, where he
says: "One of the most important aspects of the pre-trial conference is the exploration of settlement possibilities. Indeed,
most lawyers conceive of settlement as the only purpose of pretrial. The Southern District of New York has recognized this
by eliminating pre-trial in personal injury and death actions ...
and setting up a separate Settlement Calendar for them ....
There is also something more to a settlement discussion when the
court takes part in it. When a little pressure is needed, the court
often supplies it; and when the plaintiff has an inflated idea of
the value of a mediocre case, the court can gently deflate it, and
with far more effect than when defendant's counsel attempts the
same thing." 10

Mr. Wessel believes that "in so doing, the court is not departing from its office in the slightest. It is merely exercising the
mandate of the Rule to 'aid in the disposition of the action.' The
pretrial is a 'natural' for settlement opportunities if the case is
one which can be settled." 11
If pre-trial does reduce the status of a judge to that of an
"impartial referee," as Mr. Nims puts it,12 why use judges at all
in pre-trial conferences? Although only a notion, referees could
participate under those same broad powers which the courts are
now invoking, ex officio, to require litigants' appearances at pretrial conferences and, moreover, to force them to participate in
10 op cit, p. 63.

11 ibid.
12 op cit.
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the conference.1" While the use of referees is generally frowned
upon by the judiciary, by the same token, the adequacy of all
judges in a court becoming pre-tryers is questionable, since many
do not make competent pre-tryers, either by temperament, willingness or prejudice. The indiscriminate assignment of judges
to pre-trial could lead to results detrimental to litigants, should
the judge in the informality of the proceedings use his authority
to coerce a settlement.
Like the adoption of a precocious youngster, whose future is
unpredictable, a pre-trial leaves open many vital issues, only a
small portion of which have been touched upon here. Embraced
it may be by many jurisdictions in the land, including the Federal courts. 14 Yet we have no assurance that some forms of it
are, in practice, constitutionally sound. Nor is there a body
among the bar or bench that is prepared to come forward and
define its every relationship to the courts. How can this occur
when members of a single bench disagree as to its use and refuse
15
to participate as pre-tryers?
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-TRIAL
The second question posed earlier arises, provided we have
first decided that pre-trial is a legally sufficient means of improving our courts and has been surrounded with the same or comparable safeguards which our courts have heretofore known.
What, then, may we expect of pre-trial?
Putting it to use in a court and leaving all else in status quo
may well bear the analogy of replacing the shoes on a coach
horse with roller skates. The horse and its buggy are still with
us; the roller skates become an anachronism, if not a hazard.
Perhaps the most celebrated instance of judicial reform is
New Jersey's. Dockets there are current, according to the report
16
of Chief Justice Vanderbilt. But, "in curing court congestion in

172 F. (2d) 241, 243. "The spirit of a pre-trial procedure is not only to
call the parties together and ask them to stipulate as to all matters concerning which there can be no dispute, but to compel them to stipulate and
13

agree . . . The court has a right to compel the parties to do this ....

(Emphasis added.)
Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A poll taken by this writer among the 15 members of the Cuyahoga
County (0.) Common Pleas Bench in 1955 showed at least four of the
jurists refusing to accept pre-trial assignments-one because of a longstanding practice of not talking to litigants involved in any lawsuit; a second
and third because they refused to be bound by pledges of secrecy concerning settlements, and the fourth because of his doubts over the legality of
the procedure. All four, veteran judges, maintain their attitudes to this day.
16 The Challenge of Law Reform, p. 85.
14
15
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New Jersey," he writes, "we have had a revolution in judicial
and professional practice." 17
Judge Vanderbilt sets forth three major steps needed for
reform:
1. The improvement of judicial personnel, including jurors
as well as judges. This is an exceedingly crucial problem
in many jurisdictions, but one that is readily capable of
solution everywhere.
2. The simplification of judicial structure and of procedure,
so that technicalities and surprise may be avoided, and
so that procedure may become a means of achieving justice rather than an end in itself.
3. The elimination of the law's delays by modern management methods and effective leadership. Without these a
judicial establishment cannot hope to function efficiently.
18

Pre-trial in that state is one of the weapons used in whipping
docket congestion; but it is one of many, including, to begin with,
a change in the state's constitution, 19 the use of an administrative
director, the functioning of a Chief Justice with wide powers, and
the revamping of court procedure.
As one of numerous examples in contrast, the Common Pleas
Court of Cuyahoga County, which instituted pre-trial in 1953,
has no administrative officer or department; confers limited authority on its chief justice, who is so designated by his colleagues;
requires the time and energies of its 15 members on such details
as personnel, statistics, space apportionment and budget; maintains an interlocutory court for pleadings and temporary matters
that often overlap the regular work of the court, and a system of
assignment that does not give each judge a portion of the responsibility of the docket. While this court has endeavored to
improve its structure and procedure, it must needs work within
the antiquated framework established by the Legislature. Its
business has grown to the proportions that it now employs 125
persons, has an annual budget in excess of one million dollars,
and, in 1955, docketed 6,039 new civil cases, not including matrimonial matters. In that year, it disposed of 5,612 cases for a net
loss of 427. Its total backlog has exceeded 8,000 cases, and a civil
action must wait 24 to 30 months between filing and trial.
17
18

ibid, p. 93.
ibid, p. 10.

19 New Jersey Constitution, 1947, Art. V, Sec. VII.
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A four-year study conducted by this court on the efficacy
of pre-trial brought forth the following statistics:

Year
1952**
1953t
1954
1955

(2)
(1)
Settled
by Pre-Trial
SettleTrial
ments
Judge
713
497
285
208

447t
443
970
1,795

(3)

(4)

(5)*

(6)

(7)

Total
Total
Tried to Tried to Other
Jury Disposals Disposals Filings
Court
347
279
211
205

292
195
162
169

3,604
3,370
3,380
3,234

5,403
4,774
5,008
5,611

4,570
5,193
5,611
6,039

* Includes settlements and agreed judgments and verdicts reached in interlocutory court and by the Chief Justice; foreclosure decrees and uniform
support cases.
** Before pre-trial.
t Prior to 1953, the court assigned one judge to conduct pre-trial, which
bore little if any resemblance to the formalized procedure adopted in 1953.
t During 1953, two judges spent a total of 10 months on pre-trial.
During 1954, six judges devoted a total of 25 months on pre-trial.
During 1955, 10 judges spent a total of 47 months on pre-trial.

It is noteworthy that the 1,795 cases settled in pre-trial durrequired nearly a third of the total time afforded by the
1955
ing
bench.
Also, it can be seen that prior to formalized pre-trial, the
year 1952 shows that 1,160 cases were disposed of before or during trial, and an additional 639 decided by trial, for a total of
1,799. By comparison, the year 1955 shows 2,377 cases settled
(excepting column 5), so that the apparent gain over 1952 is
578 cases and is attributable to pre-trial. But, in considering
those two years only, the disposals shown in column 5 fell back
370 cases, and the net gain is 209. This last figure is obliterated
by the increase in filings in 1955 over 1952 of some 1,469 cases.
The court itself reached the conclusion that pre-trial was not
the answer to its docket congestion problem.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt suggests that "at every point of
law there must be a calm review to achieve the greatest possible
individual freedom consistent with the requirements of society
as a whole, and a painstaking reform of the law to eliminate outmoded technicalities and to assure the orderly preservation of
human rights." 20
Pre-trial, of itself, would seem to need such a "calm review"
by a responsible bar and bench, in the form of a critical evaluation going into its every relationship to the courts, the public and
the administration of justice.
20

op cit, p. 184.
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